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Evaluation of Siting Strategies: The Case of
Two UK Waste Tire Incinerators*
Ragnar E. Lfstedt**
Introduction
This paper evaluates a firm's siting strategy for tire incinerators in
two UK towns. Such incinerators, when fitted with state-of-the-art
cleaning technology, do not pose any public health hazards according
to the manufacturers. They are for various reasons becoming
increasingly difficult to site. 1 However, as waste is continuously being
created and landfill space is running out, incineration must be seen as
important for waste disposal. This is especially true for tires that do not
decompose in landfills and can produce both heat and electricity.
Risk Communication and Evaluation
Evaluations of siting strategies are important as siting is becoming
increasingly difficult. For example, in California, 28 of 34 proposed
solid waste incinerators were either postponed or cancelled in the late
1980's.2 There is little understanding of the exact reasons why siting
has been unsuccessful, and evaluative studies may offer ways to improve
strategies.
* Field work for this study was conducted by second year Research Engineers in
the Engineering Doctorate Programme jointly run by Brunel and Surrey Universities.
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Richard Scriven, Lucy Speirs, Lisa Wheelwright and Anthony Yates. Also, I thank
Kate Burningham, Roland Clift, Alison Doig, Tom Horlick-Jones and Laura Kelly
and three anonymous referees for comments on earlier versions of this paper.
** Dr. L6fstedt is a Lecturer in Social Geography at the Risk Research Group,
Centre for Environmental Strategy, University of Surrey (UK). He received his BA
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1 Douglas Easterling & Howard Kunreuther, The Dilemma of Siting a High-Level
Nuclear Waste Repository (1995); Howard Kunreuther, A Conceptual Framework
for Managing Low-probability Events, Social Theories of Risk (Sheldon Krimsky &
Dominic Golding eds. 1992).
2 Bradley Whitehead, Who Gave You the Right? Property Rights and the Potential
for Locally Binding Referenda in the Siting of Hazardous Waste Facilities (1991)
(unpublished manuscript).
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As problems surrounding siting strategies are intimately linked to
risk communication, I begin by briefly describing risk communication
studies and discuss the evaluation of risk communication programs. 3
The History ofRisk Communication
The field of risk communication evolved from psychometric risk
perception studies, associated most notably with the American
researcher Paul Slovic and his co-workers. At first, risk communication
research was seen as a government tool to develop information
programs to increase "the public's" knowledge of environmental health
and technological hazards to which they were exposed.4 This was
referred to as top-down risk communication. After researchers pointed
out that experts too are fallible and biased, the field moved toward
reciprocal risk communication to promote dialogue between the public
and experts to derive solutions acceptable to everyone. 5
Most risk communication programs in the UK have been based on
the top-down model. An example is the Government's handling of the
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) scare in which it stated that
risks were minimal without consulting the public regarding their fears
and concerns. The Government has on both national and local level also
employed dialogue techniques such as town meetings and public
inquiries on proposed road and incineration schemes. 6 These efforts
are often regarded as "quasi democratic," but meetings are held at
times when most members of the public are working, and many cannot
participate. Also, the proposers of projects usually have more resources
at hand than individuals and organizations objecting to them. 7
3 See also, Howard Kunreuther et al., Risk Perception and Trust: Challenges for
Facility Siting, 7 Risk 109 (1996).
4 National Research Council, Improving Risk Communication (1989); Harry
Otway & Brian Wynne, Risk Communication: Paradigm and Paradox, 9 RiskAnal.
141 (1989); Nick Pidgeon et al., Risk Perception, Risk Analysis, Perception, and
Management (1992).
5 William Freudenberg, Perceived Risk, Real Risk: Social Science and the Art of
Probabilistic Risk Assessment, 242 Science 44 (1988); Leroy Gould et al., Perceptions
of Technological Risks and Benefits, (1988); Christopher Hohenemser et al., The
Nature of Technological Hazard, 220 Science 378 (1983); and Improving Risk
Communication, supra.
6 For an excellent discussion regarding public inquiries consult: Timothy
O'Riordan et al., Sizewell B: An Anatomy of the Inquiry (1988).
7 Kate Burningham, The Social Construction of Social Impacts: An Analysis of
Local Responses to New Roads, (1996) (unpub. Dept. of Sociology thesis, University
of Surrey).
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Evaluation
Many risk communication guidelines have been proposed and
implemented in a relatively short time.8 However, evaluative studies
on siting strategies and risk communication programs are lacking. Past
studies indicate that, compared with setting-up and carrying out risk
communication programs, few if any resources are used to determine
success or failure because by the end of a program virtually all the
resources have been used up. 9
This needs to be redressed because "evaluation of risk
communication programs provides a central means for assuring
appropriate goals, content and outcomes of such programs. ' 1 0
Evaluations will, in the long-term, not only save time and money but
should also improve program success rates.11 They are also important
because the risk communication field has such a short history and much
advice provided by practitioners lacks empirical support. 12
Background
In the UK, cars and lorries generate 450,000 tons of waste tires per
annum. Until the Elm Energy tire incinerator in Wolverhampton was
operating, 67% of this went to the landfill, 9% was incinerated, and
24% was retreaded or used for other purposes. 13 The composition of
8 Vincent T. Covello & F. Allen, Seven Cardinal Rules of Risk Communication
(1988); Vincent T. Covello, Peter Sandman, & Paul Slovic, Risk Communication,
Risk Statistics-and Risk Comparisons: A Manual for Plant Managers (1988); Billie Jo
Hance et al., Improving Dialogue with Communities: A Risk Communication Manual
for Government (1988).
9 Roger E. Kasperson & Ingar Palmlund, Evaluating Risk Communication,
Effective Risk Communication: The Role and Responsibility of Government and
Non-government Organizations, 143 (Vincent T. Covello et al. eds. 1987).
10 Id. at 157.
11 Caron Chess et al., Results of a National Symposium on Risk Communication:
Next Steps for Government Agencies, 15 RiskAnal. 115 (1995); Caron Chess,
Kandice L. Salomone & Billie Jo Hance. Improving Risk Communication in
Government: Research Priorities, 15 RiskAnal. 127 (1995); Themes and Tasks of
Risk Communication (Helmut Jungermann et al. eds., 1989); Kasperson & Palmlund,
supra note 9; M. Granger Morgan et al., Communicating Risk to the Public, 26
Env'l Sci. & Tech. 2048 (1992); Ortwin Renn, Risk Communication: Towards a
Rational Discourse with the Public, 29 J. Hazardous Materials 465 (1992); Bernt
Rohrmann, Analyzing and Evaluating the Effectiveness of Risk Communication
Programs (1990).
12 Morgan et al., supra note 11.
13 Allison Doig, Disposal of Waste Tyres: A Working Paper (1994).
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tires make them particularly unsuitable for landfill. They do not
degrade easily or compact. Additionally, the UK has limited landfill
capacity. In many cases, tires have to be transported long distances to
be dumped. At the same time, tires have a higher calorific value than
coal largely due to a petrochemical content equivalent to 32.6 MJ/kg,
making them suitable for energy production. 14 There have been
several attempts to set up incineration plants to deal with the growing
waste problem. These efforts have been actively encouraged by the
Government. It has expressed willingness to subsidize electricity
production at some of these plants if they prove cost effective in the
long-term through the so called Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation. 15 To the
present, Elm Energy, a subsidiary of a large US based utility, has made
three attempts to site, build and operate a tire incinerator in the UK.
Two have been unsuccessful (Guildford and East Kilbride - due to
public opposition) and one successful.
This study reviews two in more detail: one in Wolverhampton
which was successful and one in Guildford which was not. We are
specifically interested in identifying the reasons. The cities are virtual
opposites. Guildford is seen as part of London's stockbroker belt where
the average household income is considerably higher and
unemployment is considerably lower than nationally. The area has little
heavy industry. Wolverhampton is a town with a great deal of heavy
industry where wages are below average and unemployment is above
average.
Methodology
To understand the policy making climate and how the public
perceived waste tire incinerators, three research methods were used:
(1) In-depth interviews with local policy makers, Elm Energy
officials and environmental non-governmental organization (NGO)
representatives were carried out. Interviews focused on why individuals
14 Id. In comparison, coal's energy equivalent varies from 18.6 to 27.9 MJ/kg.
15 The Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation is a consumer tax on non-fossil fuel electricity. A
surcharge of approximately 11% is placed on all consumer electricity bills. Most of
the money subsidizes the nuclear industry, but a small part subsidizes renewable
energy sources. In the latter case, initiators stand for capital costs, but the government
funds differences between their cost of electricity and the average pool price.
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supported or opposed the incinerators, their reasons, and whether they
had made any attempts to influence the public.
(2) Person-to-person interviews with the general public were
conducted in each town. Five areas were selected in both Guildford and
Wolverhampton. These included residential areas around the
incinerator (or proposed) site, the city centers and residential sites close
to, but not adjoining. Some locations were also chosen to allow for
consideration of the effects of the wind on plume dispersion and
subsequent odors. Ten to fifteen people were questioned in each area.
They were approached in their homes in the early evening for a
maximum response rate. The sample was not random, but every
attempt was taken to ensure that the demographic characteristics were
similar to the population in the region as a whole. Seventy-one people
were interviewed in Guildford and 65 in Wolverhampton.
(3) A content analysis of local newspapers was also carried out for
the period when the respective incinerators were of public concern. In
Wolverhampton, analysis was done on The Express and The Star
between June 1990 and March 1995; in Guildford, the Surrey
Advertiser and the Guildford Times were reviewed from November
1994 to April 1995. Analysis focused on energy, environmental and
health issues related to the two respective incinerators. Also, searches
were conducted in all major UK broadsheet newspapers, going back five
years; key words included incineration, landfill, waste and tyres.
Results
The Wolverhampton Site
The £48 million incinerator at Wolverhampton was the first
purpose-built tire incinerator of its kind in Europe. It began operation in
November 1993 and presently burns 100,000 tons of tires - equivalent
to 20% of the UK total-each year. 16 The plant has suffered some
technical problems but was not subject to serious siting controversy. 17
When it received planning permission in the autumn of 1990, a group
of local people raised concerns about it, specifically regarding pollution
and the increased heavy traffic that the plant would bring.
16 H. Simonian, Tough for Tyres, Financial Times, April 5, 1995 at 20.
17 M. Winney, Tarmac JV Issues Writ in Tyre Power Dispute, New Civil Engineer,
Sept. 21, 1995, at 3.
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Elm Energy' siting strategy in Wolverhampton
To facilitate siting in Wolverhampton, Elm Energy developed a
fairly comprehensive risk communication program. It wrote to
approximately 600 people in the vicinity, detailing the pollution control
and safety measures to be installed. An information caravan was also set
up, and monthly public meetings were also arranged to discuss
problems and concerns. Additionally, a permanent pollution
monitoring scheme was set up at the local council by Elm Energy which
allowed local government officials and the general public access to the
information on pollution levels in the area. Elm Energy also employed a
local resident to undertake public relations work and deal with
complaints. Finally, it sought an endorsement that their activities were
"environmentally friendly" from Friends of the Earth, but this was
unsuccessful because the environmental NGO had the view that using
fewer tires and recycling is better than incineration. Overall, the staff at
Elm Energy which were interviewed felt that the company had carried
out extensive risk communication work in Wolverhampton which
enabled the incinerator to be sited.
We have regular meetings in the community to get
feedback on their concerns and we have tried to understand
public concern as much as possible. [Senior consultant, Elm
Energy, Feb. 1995.]
Elm Energy's risk communication program in Wolverhampton used
both top-down and dialogue approaches. Public meetings with direct
contact between the public and Elm Energy officials allowed for
dialogue risk communication while the information caravan and
information letters were examples of a top-down risk communication.
The siting strategy could have been better. Elm Energy specifically
focused on providing public information to expedite planning. By
giving the public information, Elm Energy's spokespeople hoped that
the public would be "less ignorant" and more in favor of the plant.
With a better thought-out risk communication program, it could have
committed resources to uncover the public's perceptions of risks
associated with the plant and frame their risk communication program
based on these findings.
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The local policy makers and media in Wolverhampton
The media and the local business council had a favorable view of the
plant. The local press generally portrayed the incinerator as positive for
the area because it would create jobs and alleviate environmental
problems. Local politicians also supported the plant. In fact, the local
council went against some public opposition and voted unanimously to
build it. The council supported the plant because they felt, first, that it
would benefit the area economically and, second, that they had some
responsibility considering that most of the tires manufactured in the
UK originate in the Wolverhampton region. These views were expressed
by a local planning officer:
Elm was seen as open, honest, and upfront and we felt
that the waste tire incinerator would lead to more job
opportunities in the community.... Additionally, we
produce many tires here so it only fair that we remove some
rom circulation as well. [Local planning officer in
Wolverhampton, Feb. 1995].
The role of the environmental NGOs in Wolverhampton
During siting and construction, there was little activity by
environmental NGOs. Friends of the Earth did not have an office in
Wolverhampton until after the incinerator was completed. NGO
spokespeople in Wolverhampton had limited awareness of the
incinerator and said they could not comment on it. However, they did
state that they favored reusing and recycling tire waste rather than
incineration or landfill.
The generalpublic in Wolverhampton
Content analysis of local papers shows that during the construction
of the incinerator in Wolverhampton, journalists' found the public
mood largely hostile. Newspaper articles, based on interviews with the
public in the vicinity of the proposed incinerator, suggested that the
public did not trust Elm Energy with their primary motive being
financial gain. Although some debate in the newspapers could be the
result of "frame alignment," where local media was setting the agenda
for public debate, a closer examination of articles indicated genuine
public concern. 18 Some members of the public, for example, felt that
there was a conspiracy in which Elm Energy and the local council were
18 D. A. Snow et al., Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and
Movement Participation, 51 Am. Sociol. Rev. 464 (1986).
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worldng together. However, as has been found in other siting studies,
once the plant was operating, the media reported that residents were
less hostile. 19 In Wolverhampton, of 52 asked: "Do you feel that the
waste tire incinerator was a good idea?" Fourteen responded "yes,"
twelve "no," and 26 were indifferent.
Additionally, Wolverhampton respondents felt that the incinerator
















Overall, one could conclude that Elm Energy's strategy in
Wolverhampton was successful mainly due to a well planned risk
communication program using both top-down and dialogue strategies
which could have swayed public opinion as well as the local policy
makers . However, upon closer examination, it is unclear whether Elm
Energy's emphasis on dialogue was the main reason for success. The
local media as well as the local politicians were extremely supportive,
there was a lack of opposition from environmental NGOs, and little
organized public protest. Hence, Elm Energy's siting strategy was
largely unchallenged. The potential risks posed by the running of the
waste tire incinerator were not amplified by the media as we will see
occurred in Guildford. Additionally, no environmental groups
questioned the data provided by Elm Energy.
19 Burningham, supra note 7 and Ragnar E. L6fstedt, The Use of Biomass in a
Regional Context: The Case of Vdxjd Energi, Sweden, 11 Biomass & Bioenergy 33
(1996).
20 Based on open-ended questions where a person can give more than one answer.
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The Guildford Site
Unlike Wolverhampton, the public, policy makers and
environmental NGOs in Guildford were strongly opposed to a waste
tire incinerator from the outset.
Elm Energy in Guildford
The media analysis in Guildford indicated that Elm Energy
mounted a very weak siting strategy. Plans for the incinerator appeared
in the local press prior to any communication to local residents about
the plant. This caused public opposition immediately, and Elm made
only limited efforts to convince the local public, policy makers, and
NGOs that the plant was necessary in the area or safe. In contrast to
Wolverhampton, there was no information caravan, nor did Elm
Energy communicate directly with residents about the pros and cons of
incinerating tires. Elm Energy's unwillingness to convince the public
that the waste tire incinerator was needed was further demonstrated at
the first public meeting about the proposed plant where the managing
director of Elm Energy scoffed at comments that tires should be
recycled or reused, "The answer to waste tires is don't drive."2 1
In sum, Elm Energy did not have any form of siting strategy in
place in Guildford. Its staff did participate in one open meeting which
one may consider to be a form of dialogue risk communication, but the
company did not attempt to engage the public or the environmental
NGOs in any prolonged discussions.
The localpolicy makers and the media in Guildford
The Guildford media were generally hostile to the plant. The
media discussions, however, focused more on actors in the risk debate
which is the conflict between industry, NGOs and experts on certain
risk issues such as dioxin, rather than on the risks themselves. The
hostile stance of the media was shared by the local policy makers.
Local politicians in Guildford stressed that there is no heavy
industry in the town and hence, a waste tire incinerator would not be
welcomed. If the waste tire incinerator received planning permission,
the councilors argued, than it would attract further heavy industry. The
long-term effect of this would be the conversion of the Slyfield site in
21 J. Williams, Tyre-Burning Plant Boss Faces Critics, Surrey Advertiser, Nov. 18,
1994.
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Guildford from an industrial park composed of light industry and
office buildings to a heavy industry park with large traffic problems and
pollution. 22 At a council planning meeting, it was recommended that
the plant would be opposed because:
The proposed building and ancillary structures would be out
of scale and character with their surroundings and would
have a prominent detrimental impact on the visual amenities
of the locality....
This perception was shared by individual council officials; one
individual felt that the plant should be opposed as: "Guildford is the
healthiest borough in the country and I want it to remain so." [County
councillor, Dec. 1994.]
Another councillor described the plant as: "An abhorrence, a
danger, a blot on the landscape." [County councilor, Dec. 1994.]
However, some policy makers pointed out that they were in fact in
favor of the waste tire incinerator off the record, but as public
opposition was so strong and as local elections were then only a couple
of months away, they felt that they had to oppose it.2 3 In other words,
being opposed to the proposed incinerator was a way to win votes and
therefore, the policy makers were against it, no matter whether they
believed the incinerator to be a good or a bad project for the Guildford
Borough. This is not unique. For example, case-results from
Copenhagen show that many policy makers oppose the Swedish
Barseback nuclear power plant only twenty kilometers away because a
majority of the public oppose it - not because they themselves think
that the reactor should be closed down.24
Environmental NGOs in Guildford
Environmental NGOs were concerned that dioxins would be
produced from burning tires leading to numerous health problems. A
major environmental controversy that the NGOs fuelled was whether
tires contain dioxins or not. Several NGO-sponsored spokespeople
advocated that the tire incinerator should be opposed on the grounds
that tires contained chlorine which when burnt produces dioxins. These
22 Guildford Committee Report 1994.
23 A spokesperson interviewed at the Wolverhampton site in 1995 who wished to
remain anonymous.
24 Ragnar E. Lfstedr, Risk Communication: The Barsebdick Nuclear Plant Case,
24 Energy Policy 689 (1996).
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people emphasized the risk by citing recent studies in the U.S. that had
shown dioxins to be more damaging to human health than previously
thought. These arguments were countered by a local academic
Professor Roland Clift of the University of Surrey, who stated that tires
do not contain chlorine and therefore, do not produce dioxins.
Furthermore, it can be argued, that by displacing coal-fired generating
capacity (which does emit dioxins) the tire incinerator would in fact
reduce total national dioxin emissions.
Environmental NGOs were very active in Guildford. Both
Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth canvassed households near the
proposed site with information on the possible environmental problems
of tire incineration and they sponsored one well-attended public
meeting to discuss the pros and cons of waste tire incineration.
The Guildford Public
Unlike the Wolverhampton respondents, the Guildford respondents
were in general opposed to the plant. Of the 55 respondents asked:
"Do you feel that a waste incinerator should be built in Guildford?"
Three respondents answered "yes," 33 answered "no," and nineteen
were indifferent. 25 Moreover, the Guildford public felt that the
drawbacks would far outweigh the benefits.2 6
Table 3
The perceived benefits of the waste tire incinerator
None 20
Employment 10











25 Note that the percentage of the public who were indifferent to the incinerator was
significantly lower in Guildford than in Wolverhampton. A likely explanation is that
the incinerator controversy was more recent in Guildford at the time of interviews.
26 Based on open-ended questions where a person can give more than one answer.
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Discussion - Guildford site
A possible explanation of why the public was so opposed to the
siting of an incinerator in Guildford, but not in Wolverhampton, is the
social amplification of the risk in the former. This framework was
developed by Kasperson and Renn 2 7 and suggests that "The social
amplification of risk is based on the thesis that events pertaining to
hazards interact with psychological, social, institutional, and cultural
processes in ways that can heighten or attenuate individual and social
perceptions and shape risk behavior. "28 The potential siting caused
outrage among the Guildford public who perceived the plant to be out
of place in a suburban town. This was the initial part of the
amplification process. Local policy makers, sensing the fears of the
public, acted on this by refusing Elm Energy's planning permission.
The strength of the policy makers' reaction towards siting led to a
further amplification of risk through so called "secondary feedbacks"
from anti-incinerator newspaper articles and further debate. An
example of a secondary feedback is seen in articles of the Surrey
Advertiser in the autumn of 1994 and spring of 1995, when local
environmental NGOs introduced quasi-misinformation that burning
tires produce dioxins.
Another possible reason why the public opposed the proposed
incinerator more in Guildford than in Wolverhampton is because they
saw the risks of the incinerator to be greater. If one compares Tables 1
and 2 for Wolverhampton and Tables 3 and 4 for Guildford, two
interesting observations can be made. First, respondents in the two sites
had very similar views on the perceived benefits of waste tire
incineration (e.g. employment opportunities and tire disposal), but
second, the Guildford respondents perceived the risks of waste tire
incineration to be comparably greater. One could therefore hypothesize
that the Guildford public was hostile because it saw the risks as much
greater than in Wolverhampton. 2 9
27 Roger E. Kasperson et al., The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual
Framework, 8 RiskAnalysis 177-87 (1987).
28 Ortwin Renn, Risk Communication and the Social Amplification of Risk,
Communicating Risks to the Public, 287 (Roger E. Kasperson & Peter Stallen eds.
1991).
29 This finding needs further exploration as it goes against some of the results
reported in the risk research. In this case, however, there was no correlation between
high perceived risk and low perceived benefit. Rather the respondents with the high
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To conclude, the evaluation of Elm Energy's strategy in Guildford
indicates a very limited effort. It attempted to communicate to the
public solely via one meeting organized by the Guildford Environment
forum. Perhaps, after a painless victory in Wolverhampton where it had
mounted an impressive risk communication strategy, the company had
become complacent. In any case, as it did not participate in the ensuing
debate, it could not expect to win. Local opposition was entrenched
because policy makers, the public, the media and particularly
representatives from local environmental NGOs all opposed the plant.
Part of this could be due to the social amplification of risks discussed
above, but there are two other explanations. First, the plant would be
sited simply in the wrong place because Guildford has no heavy
industry and does not want any heavy industry. Second, there was
heavy opposition from environmental NGOs. Opinion polls in the UK
indicate that the public perceive environmental NGOs as more credible
source than industry or government, and it would have been difficult
for Elm Energy to gain public confidence when the Friends of the Earth
and the other groups were so critical.30
In any case, after the borough council refused to grant it planning
permission for the incinerator and when the Department of Trade and
Industry withdrew potential subsidies for electricity production at the
site (the so called Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation), Elm Energy withdrew
its plans for an incinerator in Guildford.
Discussion
There are several reasons why a waste tire incinerator was sited in
Wolverhampton and not in Guildford. Elm Energy mounted a credible
siting strategy in Wolverhampton based on top-down and dialogue risk
communication. In Guildford, it had no real strategy. Further, in
Guildford the environmental NGOs mounted their own top-down risk
communication strategy by canvassing households near the proposed
site and holding a public meeting.
perceived risk perceived the benefits virtually as high as the Wolverhampton residents
who perceived the risks as less.
30 Claire Marris et al., Integrating Sociological and Psychological Approaches to
Public Perceptions of Environmental Risks: Detailed Results from a Questionnaire
Survey (1996); Robert M. Worcester, Assessing the Public Opinion on the
Environment: The Predictable Shock of Brent Spar (1995).
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In retrospect, it seems that in Wolverhampton, Elm Energy was the
main driver, taking the initiative to undermine public opposition and
gain confidence of local policy makers. In Guildford, environmental
NGOs, the media and some policy makers were the main policy
drivers, not only placing Elm Energy on the defensive from the outset,
but also amplifying the risks in the process.
Additionally, the site in Wolverhampton was in a depressed area
and policy makers felt that the community would benefit from an
incinerator. As a result, both local policy makers and the media
supported Elm Energy's efforts. The Slyfield site of Guildford is
located in an area where light industry and office buildings are present.
The area is not depressed. An incinerator in this location would have
been fully out of place. In fact, the argument that the incinerator would
increase employment in the area did not carry any weight, as policy
makers and special interest groups felt that light industry or office
blocks would create more employment.3 1
The issue of responsibility was important in determining whether an
incinerator received planning permission or not. Wolverhampton, is
located in an industrial area where 90% of UK tires are made, and local
policy makers felt a certain responsibility to dispose of some of them.
In contrast, policy makers and interest groups in Guildford felt that the
borough should not be responsible for burning such a large number of
tires because most would be trucked in from outlying areas. They
simply did not think it was fair, a point which Kunreuther and his
colleagues see as an important part of their siting credo. 32
Finally, the issue of local elections could have been a contributing
factor in Guildford. Although more research is needed, maybe, if it had
not been an election year or if the councilors' seats had been safer, the
Guildford Borough Council would not have opposed the incinerator.
31 P. Slade, Slyfield is a Regional Issue, Not a Local One, Surrey Advertiser, Sept.
12, 1994, at 21.
32 Howard Kunreuther et al., Siting Noxious Facilities: A Test of the Siting Credo,
13 RiskAnal. 30 (1993).
Iiifstedt: Evaluation of Siting Strategies 77
Conclusion
This pilot study has evaluated Elm Energy's waste tire incinerator
siting strategy in two UK towns. The results indicate that it mounted a
substantial effort in Wolverhampton, employing both top-down and
dialogue risk communication strategies. However, in Guildford where
it was unsuccessful, no form of risk communication was conducted.
Of several possible reasons why a tire incinerator was sited in one
area but not another, among those to be more fully investigated are:
* The opinions of local policy makers are important particularly early
on in the siting process. Where policy makers perceive a community
benefit from an incinerator such as jobs in a depressed area, they may
still push forward a siting process although the public may oppose it.
0 The issue of responsibility can also be important. In
Wolverhampton the council felt that the town made a significant
contribution to the waste tire problem (as they manufactured so many
of them) and therefore, believed that they should be responsible for
disposing some of the tires. Guildford, on the other hand, has no local
tire making industry and hence, policy makers felt little responsibility
for disposing some of the waste tires.
a The existing industrial infrastructure of an area is also important in
determining whether a siting of a noxious facility will face public and
political opposition.
a Companies that want to site such noxious facilities need to plan a
credible risk communication program and commit resources to refining
this program throughout the planning process. Elm Energy did this in
Wolverhampton but failed in Guildford.
* Environmental NGOs can significantly shape the policy outcome.
In Guildford, environmental NGOs dominated the discussion in the
media and their direct mailing to the residents closest to the plant
generated a large degree of opposition.
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